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Abstract 
 
In this paper we argue that violence is curiously both absent and present within organization 
studies. By violence we mean actual or potential physical harm and, building on an insight 
from Norbert Elias, we suggest that such violence is both ‘totally familiar yet hardly 
perceived’ in organizations. We examine how in two major traditions of organization studies, 
one deriving from Weber and the other from Foucault, violence figures as, respectively, an 
‘absent-presence’ and a ‘present-absence’. We then propose that a sensibility towards 
violence enables the recognition of ‘the blood and bruises’ of organizational life: something 
present close to home as well as faraway; here and now rather than long ago; and featuring 
in ‘normal’ organizations as well as in abnormal or exceptional circumstances. 
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In Honduras, when filling out a particularly large order on a tight deadline, factory 
managers have been reported injecting workers with amphetamines to keep them 
going on forty-eight-hour marathons (Klein, 2000: 216). 
 
Violence – by which we mean actual or potential physical violence - occupies a strange and 
paradoxical place within organizations and the study of organizations. Our argument in this 
essay is that it is both absent and present; both visible and invisible; ubiquitous and yet rare. 
In this way, violence and organizations mirror wider issues about the place of violence within 
modern societies. Norbert Elias famously charted the civilizing process through which 
violence is gradually displaced in such societies but does not disappear, so that “a 
continuous, uniform pressure is exerted on individual life by the physical violence stored 
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behind the scenes of everyday life, a pressure totally familiar and hardly perceived” (Elias, 
1978: 450).  
 
This fugitive “behind the scenes” existence has the consequence that there are quite 
contradictory ways of apprehending, or not apprehending, violence within organizations and 
organization studies. Thus: 
 
“There is widespread agreement among writers on organizational violence that violence in 
organizations is increasing and this is reflected in the growing research interest in this area” 
(Bishop et al., 2005: 584) 
 
Yet: 
 
“Studies into organizational violence have been relatively few” (Kenny, 2016: 941). 
 
Some of this can be attributed to how narrowly or extensively violence is defined, of course, 
and in particular whether what is meant is literal physical violence. Equally, studies of 
organizational violence might encompass anything from bullying amongst workmates to the 
organization of military forces. We will discuss issues of defintional extensiveness later, but 
something else is at play here: a fundamentally indeterminacy about the place and extent of 
violence in modern societies (Walby, 2012; Malešević, 2013; Asad, 2015; Malešević, 2017). 
Thus one could just as easily make the argument that violence is more prevalent than it has 
ever been as that it is gradually becoming rarer or, just, that it is too early to tell (Malešević, 
2017).  
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What this indeterminacy might suggest is that asking whether violence is or is not present in 
society (or organizations, or organization studies) is to be asking the wrong question, or to 
be looking for the wrong kind of answer. Instead, if we follow the implications of Elias’s 
formulation of something continuous but hardly perceived, we can instead ask: how is 
violence both present and absent in organizations and organization studies? 
It is obviously beyond the scope of this essay to review the entirety of this question. Instead, 
we want only to propose that attention to it will recast our understanding of organizations 
by being alert to the violence “behind the scenes” that we may see if we look for it. For 
example, as Cooke (2003) shows, slavery and the “management” of slave labour have left an 
imprint in scientific management. Less known is the presence of violence in what appears in 
organization studies as the humanistic psychology of the Human Relations movement. So 
although this movement emphasized group norms and human needs, Roethlisberger and 
Dickson’s (1939) study at the Western Electric plant identified how “pinging the upper arm” 
(meaning to hit with an iron bar) was one means by which these group norms were 
enforced. Here violence is only hinted at, seemingly hovering in the background of what 
appears to be a purely psychological process. Or to take a third example, Hearn (1994: 733) 
argues that it is now almost forgotten that the original Tavistock School human relations 
research programme was “centrally concerned with violence” not least in its practical focus 
on the survivors of war and prison camps. Or, as a final illustration, the very deep and 
multiple historical interconnections between organization and management theory, on the 
one hand, and the military, war, and genocide on the other (see e.g. Locke, 1996; Grey, 
1999; Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Bloomfield et al., 2017). These examples all in different ways 
illustrate the underlying point that if we look at organizations and organization studies in a 
 4 
certain way violence becomes visible and present; if we look at them in another way it 
becomes invisible and absent.  
Thus what we want to argue is not (simply) that we can find violence in this or that place 
but, more expansively, for a way of approaching organizations with a certain sensibility 
towards violence. In pursuit of that, we first discuss in more detail what is meant by violence 
and argue that there is a case to give particular priority to actual or potential physical 
violence. Then, we consider the ways that violence is ‘absented’ within organization studies, 
whilst also being paradoxically present, by considering Weber and Foucault as representing 
two big, significant, almost field-defining theoretical traditions within the discipline (Clegg, 
1994). In Weberian traditions we suggest that violence is an absent presence, lurking hidden 
behind the concept of authority; in Foucauldian traditions we suggest it is a present absence, 
lying in plain sight but decentred by the concept of disciplinary power.  Finally, we consider 
the ways in which violence in organizations may become more visible if we adopt a 
sensibility of openness to its existence.  
What constitutes violence? 
Violence can take various shapes and forms: it can range from being legitimate to 
illegitimate, subtle to brutal, cold to hot, physical to symbolic and structural, individual to 
collective, subjective to objective (Walby, 2012; Kilby, 2013). Given the complexity of the 
phenomenon, most researchers refrain from providing a clear definition of violence 
(Schinkel, 2013) and some (e.g. Hearn, 1994) prefer to speak of ‘violences’. Indeed, one may 
argue that the very way in which violence is defined constitutes a political question, 
embedded in particular historical, cultural and social contexts. For instance, in defining 
violence as “intentional physical harm” it becomes something traceable and locatable that 
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can be attributed to particular individuals (Schinkel, 2013). This, however, risks leaving out 
more structural forms of violence:  
 
At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and 
terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to step back, to 
disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible ‘subjective’ 
violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the 
contours of the background which generates such outbursts (Žižek, 2008: 1) 
 
For Galtung (1969), violence does not need to involve intentional physical force, as is the 
case when social inequalities lead to deaths (e.g. because of lack of access to health care 
systems). Here violence occurs at the structural rather than inter-personal level. Recently in 
the UK, a fire in a social housing tower block that caused multiple fatalities was described by 
some as ‘social murder’. The significance of that is to recognize that violence need not be 
something done ‘by X to Y’ but can rather be embedded in social relations. Thus (as in similar 
cases in other countries) the tower fire reveals how marginalized communities are relegated 
to, and concentrated in, housing which has inadequate fire protection. Their lives are 
considered – not by any particular person, but as a cumulative effect of social and 
institutional decisions – less important or less worthy of protection. Such violence is invisible 
in the normal run of things but becomes visible episodically, as with the tower fire: thus we 
can see the violence is latent in the social relations even if it is not realised until the fire 
occurs. 
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Similarly, there is the question to what extent violence operates on the physical and/or 
symbolic level. Bourdieu (2000) famously refers to symbolic violence to capture how the 
dominant class imposes upon others their understanding of the situation, thereby 
naturalizing the status quo. Although Bourdieu does not exclude, and in fact is interested in, 
the relation between symbolic and physical violence, his analysis nevertheless remains 
“curiously bloodless” (Van Holdt, 2012: 127). Thus this concept of symbolic violence is 
readily disentangled from that which involves physical harm. Writing about organizational 
violence specifically, Bergin and Westwood (2003: 211) regard it as “clearly not confined” to 
physical harm and think it is important to recognize that even writing, editorialising and 
publishing are inherently violent processes. 
 
For some purposes such a broad conception of violence is undoubtedly useful (see also 
Butler, 2010) but it carries the risk of not paying enough attention to what makes physical 
harm distinctive. Thus, we believe that in order to speak of violence and make it an 
analytically distinct concept, some form of physical harm needs to be present or potentially 
present (see also Collins, 2009) even if it also entails a symbolic dimension. The dilemma 
here goes to the heart of the paradox of violence as both absent and present. If we draw the 
definition narrowly to mean physical violence we make non-physical violence invisible. But if 
we draw the definition widely to include all kinds of violence, then we at least downplay, 
and perhaps make invisible, physical violence. If it is everywhere, it is also, in some way, 
nowhere. 
 
There is a strong case for regarding physical violence as distinctive. As the German 
sociologist Heinrich Popitz points out, physical violence interrelates with power in the 
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crudest way to the extent that each human being has a body and this makes him or her 
inherently vulnerable: “the person can perhaps separate her-/himself from social belongings 
… s/he may feel independent from her/his material possession … but s/he can never 
separate her-/himself from the body” (Popitz, 1999: 45; our translation). Violence affects not 
only the “integrity of the body, but also inevitably the person” (ibid). As Sofsky (1996: 19; 
our translation) also emphasises: “physical violence is the most intense evidence of power … 
no language has more convincing force than the language of violence. It does not need 
translation and does not leave any open questions”. This does not mean, though, that 
violence does not have a symbolic dimension. On the contrary, physical harm against the 
body deeply affects the person’s sense of worth, dignity and ultimatey the self (Kilby, 2013). 
But this is precisely to underscore that there is something special, powerful and potentially 
horrific about physical violence. It is this sense of violence as physical violence or potential 
physical violence that we want to show is both absent and present in organization studies 
and organizations.  
 
Absenting violence: Weber and Foucault 
 
Weber, legitimacy and violence 
There exists a long tradition within the political theory of the sovereign state whereby the 
exercise of power through violence is understood to be different from the exercise of 
authority understood as being the legitimate right to be obeyed. Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan 
(1651) was arguably the first text if not to propose then at least to “clarify” this distinction 
(Raphael, 1977: 71). For Hobbes there are two interrelated points. On the one hand, power 
through violence is rather limited in its effectiveness as it is impractical constantly to 
 8 
exercise it. On the other hand, power creates no obligations on the part of the ruled. So 
whilst the sovereign certainly can and does use violent power that is not enough in order to 
rule effectively. Instead, those subject to sovereign power must both accept its right to 
exercise force and also consent to obey it even in the absence of the exercise of force. 
 
Weber takes over this Hobbesian distinction almost wholesale in his 1919 essay Politics as 
Vocation. Starting from an agreement with Trotsky that every state is founded on force, 
Weber goes on to propose that the links between the modern state and violence are 
“especially intimate” to the extent that, in his famous definition, the state has “the 
monopoly of the legitmate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, in Gerth & 
Mills, 1991: 78; emphasis original). On the question of where this legitimacy comes from, he 
propounds that triad of sources of authority that have now found their way into 
organization studies textbooks: tradition, charisma and rational legality (1991: 78-79). 
 
It is clear from these passages that Weber did not envisage authority as something separate 
from violence, but that they were absolutely intertwined, not because authority came from 
violence but because the right to use violence came from authority. Indeed, in German the 
word for authority – Gewalt – also refers to violence. Equally clearly, what was under 
discussion was the authority of, specifically, the state. Richard Swedberg (1998: 55-6), a 
leading Weber scholar, argues that for Weber the political order rests on violence whereas 
the economic order does not ‘formally’ do so - and yet, since the economic order is 
guaranteed by the political order, violence is ultimately at its base. In this sense, the concept 
of rational-legal authority in Weber is inseparable from the violence which underpins the 
political constitution of the modern state. In this way, Weber parallels Walter Benjamin’s 
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later ideas in his Critique of Violence (Benjamin, 1921; see also Anter, 2014). Here Benjamin 
argues that the state is not only legitimized through violence but also may legitimize the 
continuous use of violence for preserving the status quo. In other words, rather than 
conceiving of violence, power and authority as opposites (see Arendt, 1970), Weber and 
Benjamin show the importance of approaching them as interrelated phenomena.  
 
Whereas Benjamin’s work on violence has received relatively little attention in organization 
studies, Weber’s ideas have, of course, been foundational to the discipline. Yet the way in 
which, in particular, his conception of rational-legal authority entered the field paid little 
attention to this interrelation of power, authority and violence. Rather, it was in association 
with another part of Weber’s work, namely that on bureaucracy (Cummings et al., 2017: 
120; Clegg, 1994: 150). This, too, was predicated on rational-legal authority, and was very 
often associated with the state. However, within organization studies bureaucracy came to 
be understood as an ideal type of organizations of all sorts and, as the subject developed, 
much more as something to do with commercial corporations (i.e. the economic order, in 
Swedberg’s terms) than with the state (i.e. the political order, in Swedberg’s terms). 
Moreover, as has been widely discussed (e.g. Marsden & Townley, 1996: 661), the take up of 
Weber within organization studies had a particular character. He was co-opted as an anti-
Marxist theorist and one whose ideal type of bureaucracy was not an analytical construct 
but a normative organizational design model (Cummings et al., 2017: 122-126; Clegg, 1994: 
150). In this way, not only was Weber’s critique of bureaucracy sidelined, but so too was the 
Marxist understanding of organizations as sites of conflict and exploitation. For example, in 
the influential Parsonian translation of Weber the term Herrschaft (domination) was 
rendered as “leadership” (Cummings et al., 2017: 129), thus denuding it of its forceful 
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character. This is emblematic of the way that Weber was co-opted by organization theory in 
ways which were neglectful, or forgetful, of the political sociology that characterised his 
work. 
 
So there is a triple movement in how organization studies made use of Weber: violence is 
decoupled from authority; authority is decoupled from the state; the state is decoupled 
from organizations. The consequence is that violence is both present and absent in 
particular ways. It is present at the margins as a potential – in the end we must obey the rule 
of law including those things that organizations may legally ask of us and do to us. And yet it 
is absent from accounts of the everyday experience of organizational life to the extent that, 
without any invocation of violence, it is assumed that we do what organizations legally ask of 
us and accept what they legally do to us. Hearn and Parkin (2001: 8) hint at this in seeing 
Weberian organization theory as contributing to the ‘unspoken’ in organizations, in which 
category they include violence. And this persists both in more recent organization theories 
that grow in part from Weber (institutional theory being the most obvious example) and, 
more generically, within organization studies as a whole to the extent that it has been 
shaped by the legacy of Weber as the “inadvertent” founder of the field (Clegg, 1994). Thus 
violence in this tradition is a kind of ‘absent presence’ – not foregrounded but lurking in the 
background behind authority, ready to pounce. 
 
Foucault, sovereign power and disciplinary power 
Of course, by no means all of organization studies sit within the shadow of Weber. In more 
recent times, especially, a Foucauldian understanding of disciplinary power has become 
highly influential in the field. In doing so, it largely followed Foucault’s departure from a 
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juridical understanding of power, where a sovereign exercises power through repression, 
prohibition and violence.  
 
As with Weber, the starting point for Foucault’s understanding of power can also be 
understood in terms of the classical themes of the political theory of the sovereign state. But 
whereas Weber endorsed and incorporated those themes, Foucault rejected them, most 
famously in his remark that “we need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that has 
still to be done” (Foucault, 1980: 121). 
 
Thus in Discipline and Punish (1977), which Curtis (2014: 1760) argues has been his most 
influential text in organization studies, Foucault begins with a gruesome account of how pre-
modern sovereign power is characterised by grotesque episodes of violence focused on the 
literal breaking of the body. His thesis in the book as a whole is that disciplinary power 
emerged in the 18th century and breaks with earlier sovereign power that uses repression 
and violence to punish individuals. Foucault argues that disciplinary power functions in ways 
exemplified by the Benthamite panopticon. The power that is exercised in the panopticon is 
no longer in the hand of particular individuals but rather stems from the particular 
“distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes” (Foucault, 1977: 218). This power works 
through the ways in which subjects inscribe themselves in power relations. Thus in the 
panopticon there is no need for force, constraint and repression since, as Foucault notes, 
following Bentham, there were “no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all that 
was needed was that the separations should be clear and the openings well arranged“ 
(Foucault, 1977: 218). This is the case because the subject “plays both roles” of the guard 
and the prisoner: “he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (Foucault, 1977: 219).  
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While Foucault did not deny the existence of sovereign power, he arguably believed that it is 
primarily disciplinary rather than sovereign power that characterises modern, liberal society 
(see also Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014). As a result, he suggested that “[i]n order to conduct a 
concrete analysis of power relations, one would have to abandon the juridical notion of 
sovereignty” (Foucault, 1994: 59; see also Foucault, 2001: 74). It is for this reason that the 
King’s head is to be removed.  
 
In recent years, several social theorists have criticized Foucault’s work for too easily turning 
a blind eye to violence. The fundamental issue, according to Walby (2012), lies in Foucault’s 
conception of disciplinary society as characterising today’s liberal societies. Here “[t]here is 
no need for arms, physical violence, [or] material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, 
a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is 
his own overseer, each individual thus exercising the surveillance over, and against, himself” 
(Foucault cited in Dungey, 2014: 58). In focusing primarily on disciplinary power, the danger 
becomes that the still existing forms of violence associated with sovereign power are no 
longer sufficiently made visible. 
 
This is also the point that Alford (2000) makes in his provocative essay “What would it 
matter if everything Foucault said about prisons were wrong?” He forcefully argues that 
Foucault’s conception of the panopticon and therefore disciplinary power in modern society 
misses the point. Echoing Elias (1978), Alford shows it is not that violence disappeared, but 
that it moved out of sight. He urges us to pay more attention to the tunnels underneath the 
panopticon that can extend to anywhere; here the “brute, physical coercion, the type 
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exercised in prisons, can suddenly appear anywhere. This may seem unlikely. Unless you are 
a black man stopped by the police in the middle of the night. Then it may not seem quite so 
metaphorical. Brute, physical coercion is not the last resort of the regime, any regime. It is 
the first, which means that it is the veiled threat behind every act of political power - that is, 
every act of power” (Alford, 2000: 141). Following this, disciplinary power should be 
understood as existing alongside the potential threat of violence – violence that can 
suddenly appear, yet otherwise remains behind the scenes.  
 
Most famously, Agamben (1998) has sought to address what he regards as a shortcoming of 
Foucault’s work, namely its insufficient theorization of the most violent forms of power: 
“Foucault … never dwelt on the exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the concentration 
camp and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century“ (1998: 10; 
see also Plamper, 2002; Kessler, 2014). In order to account theoretically for this, Agamben 
argues that a notion of sovereign power based on juridico-institutional terms – one which 
Foucault turned away from – needs to be brought back. Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s 
conception of the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception”, Agamben defines the 
sovereign as having legal authority, being able to decide the law’s threshold vis-à-vis the 
nonlegal and thus the state of exception, which is both inside and outside the law (the law 
allows for its own suspension). In such a state of exception – for Agamben, the camp is the 
prime example – violence can occur, as the law is both suspended and in force. Here the 
sovereign has the power to decide over life and death. Importantly, Agamben’s notion of 
sovereign power also differs from how Foucault envisioned biopower; instead of 
Foucauldian biopower that works through knowledge/power regimes aimed at optimizing 
and enhancing life, Agamben’s power is one that uses violence, threatening and killing life.  
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This is not to say that Foucault argued that violence no longer plays any role in modern 
society (see Oksala, 2010). Yet what his work has been criticized for is that, first, the focus on 
disciplinary power and biopower in combination with the “decisive abondonment“ 
(Agamben, 1998:10) of a traditional notion of sovereign power runs the risk of not 
sufficiently bringing to light the (potential) presence of violence. Second, how different 
forms of power “converge remains strangely unclear in Foucault’s work“ (Agamben, 1998: 
11). Put differently, there is a need to see the interrelation between power and violence, i.e. 
how more subtle forms of power, which produce, discipline and govern subjects, exist 
alongside the presence of potentially more coercive and violent forms (see also Walby, 
2012; Ayyash, 2013).  
 
This is apparent in that way that the work of Foucault has been used in organization studies 
so as to make violence rather invisible. His ideas have entered the field in such a way as to 
suggest that sovereign power and the violence associated with it is an irrelevance. Thus 
“Foucault’s conception of power is one that attempts to break decisively with ‘mechanistic’ 
and ‘sovereign’ view” (Clegg, 1994: 158). Even if not so explicitly stated, this is implicitly and 
de facto the case since Foucauldian research in organization studies rarely, if ever, discusses 
physical violence in organizations. It is notable that in what Curtis (2014: 1755) regards as 
the text that “formally introduced [Foucault] to the field of organization studies” it is held 
that “the disciplinary mode replaced the traditional in less than a century … extremes of 
violence inflicted on the body speedily diminished … but were replaced, according to 
Foucault, by complex, subtle forms of correction and training” (Burrell, 1988: 225, emphasis 
added). This may illustrate how, or even be one important reason why, Foucault has been 
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used in organization studies in ways that, as Raffnsøe et al. (2016) argue, over-state general 
periodizations at the expense of appreciating the “dispositive analytics” whereby social 
technologies of power are interrelated. If so, it does not negate the point that within 
organization studies Foucault has typically been used as we suggest. Of course, it is hard to 
prove a negative. But of the many papers discussing disciplinary power organizations with 
which we are familiar, if violence features at all it is only to the extent that it is seen as 
displaced by disciplinary power. 
 
So if in the Weberian tradition of organization studies violence is an ‘absent presence’, in the 
Foucauldian tradition it is a ‘present absence’ – hidden but in plain sight being written in, 
most dramatically, right from the outset only to be crowded out by the focus on disciplinary 
power that follows from it. All this suggests that researchers need to develop a stronger 
sensibility towards their use of theoretical sources, and how this can make violence absent 
or present. Which prompts the question: how can we bring violence in organizations into 
sight?  
 
The blood and bruises of organizational life 
We began this essay with a quotation above about the use of amphetamines to boost 
productivity. It is an example of organizational violence and moreover of a particular sort – 
violence woven into an everyday organizational logic, that of maximizing productivity. It’s 
possible to envisage that within the organizational context it occurs it is seen as no more 
remarkable than any other way of raising productivity and, in that context, invisible. 
Reported out of that context it becomes visible as violent but then, in another way, can 
disappear from view again as being something to do with so-called developing countries or 
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those with poor human rights records. Of course, it is very important to bring into focus how 
multinational corporations are implicated in the dispossession and deaths of whole 
populations, continuing the violent history of colonialism (Banerjee, 2008) and how such 
“corporate violence remains unchecked” (Varman & Al-Amoudi, 2016) in developing 
countries. Yet this focus should not be used to validate an understanding of violence in 
organizations as something that happens only far away (from our point of view) and can 
therefore be held at a distance.   
By contrast, we can make visible or present organizational violence by bringing it close, to 
show how it occurs in advanced and democratic countries. Thus Perelman (2005: 66-67) 
discusses various examples of companies refusing to allow workers toilet breaks – in one 
case being instructed to urinate in their clothes instead, leading to bladder and urinary tract 
infections. This company was located in California, the richest part of the most developed 
liberal democracy in the world. These are not isolated cases: in November 2016 Oxfam 
America produced a report showing that poultry workers across the United States are 
routinely prevented from using the toilet and many have to wear diapers in order to get 
throught their shifts (Oxfam America, 2016). 
Coming this side of the Atlantic, at Sports Direct, a UK sports equipment firm, it was revealed 
in 2016 that “there had been 110 ambulance call-outs to [the] main warehouse site in just 
over three years as workers suffered chest pains, stroke, injury, and five births or 
miscarriages – including one woman delivering her baby in the toilet – such was the fear, 
according to the union, of losing your job if you took time off under Ashley’s [Sports Direct’s 
boss] six-strikes-and-you’re-out regime“ (Lawrence, 2016). 
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Violence is also made visible when it is recognized that there are links between ‘far away’ 
production and our own practices of consumption. Chan’s (2013) study of suicide attempts 
at Foxconn in China is illustrative of this because the firm was a supplier to Apple and other 
companies whose products are widely familiar all around the world. The intense discipline of 
life on the line at Foxconn is described in chilling detail, culminating thus: “The accumulated 
effects of endless assembly line toil, punishing work schedules, harsh factory discipline, a 
friendless dormitory and, rejection from managers and administrators, compounded by the 
company’s failure to provide her with income, and then her inability to make contact with 
friends and family, were the immediate circumstances of her attempted suicide. Her 
testimony reveals how she was overwhelmed, ‘I was so desperate that my mind went blank’. 
At 8 a.m. on March 17, Yu jumped from the fourth floor of her dormitory building in despair. 
After 12 days in a coma, she awoke to find that her body had become half paralysed. She is 
now confined to a bed or a wheelchair” (Chan, 2013: 91). 
 
The evident violence here is the attempted suicide, but what is also made visible by it is the 
violence embedded within the organizational practices that provoked it. This means that we 
cannot hold Yu’s attempted suicide ‘at a distance’ as, perhaps, an individual tragedy but are 
forced to recognize it as embedded in an organizational violence with which we (as 
consumers) are also in some way involved, if not indeed complicit. And, again, this is not an 
isolated example to do with developing countries. Consider the spate of sixty-nine suicides 
at France Telecom between 2008 and 2011. These seem to have been linked – explicity, in 
some of the suicide notes left – to the pressures of a change programme, which sought to 
‘financialise’ the organization in line with an ideology of shareholder value (Chabrak et al., 
2016). 
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As with the Foxconn case, the point here is not simply the violence of suicide, it is the way 
that this grows out of the violence of the organizational practices, which engendered it. The 
‘abnormality‘ of suicide – which is shocking – makes visible the ‘normality’ of organizational 
violence, which we might not otherwise notice. It would, to reprise Elias, be “totally familiar 
and hardly perceived”. Indeed, for this reason it is not sufficient to point to violence in “total 
institutions” (Goffman, 1961), which are cut off from the rest of society, such as psychiatric 
hospitals or prisons where “violence ... looms in the daily life“ (Berkeley Journal of African 
American Law and Policy, 2009: 91) of the patients and inmates. The same goes for ‘camps‘. 
These are liminal spaces, often located at the borders of societies and, indeed, emblematic 
of Agamben’s state of exception (Fassin, 2011; Ramadan, 2013; Darling, 2017). Here the lives 
and bodies of refugees are governed and managed by state authorities. Whereas camps are 
created as a “protective device” (Agier, 2002), the fact that they represent a state of 
exception means that violence can more easily emerge here. This is apparent when 
“refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants ... [face] a violent and repressive 
geography of walls, coastguard patrols, detention camps and offshore processing“ 
(Ramadan, 2013: 65; see also Valentino & Knudsen, 1996).  In primarily focusing on cases, 
such as prisons or camps, where violence is more visible and perhaps almost to be expected, 
the danger is that violence becomes equated with something that only occurs in ‘abnormal‘ 
organizational settings – far from ’normal’ ones. Of course – that is to say: as a matter of 
course – organizations seek to maximize productivity, to reduce costs, to reorganize so as to 
create shareholder value. It is only occasionally that the violence that entails or engenders 
comes into view and that which is absent becomes, if only briefly, present. 
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This points towards another aspect of the dynamic of the visibility and invisibility of 
organizational violence. It is not just a matter of distance (in space and time), but also one of 
normalization. Kenny’s (2016) study of violence in Ireland’s industrial schools is highly 
insightful in this respect. There is an obvious sense in which such violence was hidden from 
sight (that is, it occurred out of view, within the confines of the schools) in ways which have 
become all too familiar in numerous recent scandals involving physical and sexual abuse in 
children’s homes and other institutions around the world. But Kenny makes the point that 
the social and organizational context meant that “there were no children worthy of 
protection in Ireland’s industrial schools – there was only the shadowy, repulsive other that 
was a persistent blight on the national identity” (2016: 954). That is to say, violence was 
normalized because its victims were constructed not as children but as ‘abject others’ to 
whom no rights of protection were due. And, thus, the violence to which they were 
subjected was “hardly perceived” (as per Elias) as violence. 
 
It is this issue of the social construction of violence within particular organizational settings 
which gives it its’ ‘now you see it, now you don’t’ character. Bishop et al.’s (2005) study of 
the invisibility of violence in a job centre is illustrative of this. Whereas front line workers 
frequently experienced physical violence from the clients or ‘customers’ of the centre, this 
was rendered invisible because it was not acknowledged by managers or, if it was, was 
blamed upon the victims rather than the perpetrators (echoing the ‘abject others’ of Kenny’s 
study). Moreover, to the extent that front line workers developed various ways of coping 
with violence they, themselves, kept it hidden from the view of managers. In a similar vein, 
Baines and Cunningham (2011) found that staff in non-profit care work had to frequently 
endure violence from customers. They argue that it “became an actual aspect of the work-
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effort bargain and a problem for which solutions, other than tolerance, were not sought“ 
(2011: 773). As in the Bishop et al. study, workers themselves developed ways of coping with 
violence that, however, led to “the normalization of violence and excusing ... [violent] 
behaviour as ‘just part of the job’“ (2011: 769). While Baines and Cunningham (2011) point 
to resistance from trade union representatives in form of campaigns demanding accurate 
management reports of violence, the organizational culture and the “games“ (Burawoy, 
1979) of workers “encouraged ... [them] to downplay and refuse to document their injuries“ 
(2011: 770). In other words, these studies show how workers themselves may also keep 
violence invisible from management and others. So, was there or was there not violence in 
the job centre or care work settings? Do we say that it was absent or that it was present? 
 
The way that we answer that kind of question is crucially bound up with the sensibility we 
bring to bear upon it, which will in turn be reflective of political and social apprehensions of 
normality. For example, Hearn (1994) argues that violence is often hidden or 
unacknowledged because of its gendered nature: violence is bound up with men’s power. 
Thus, violent behaviour is often treated as an “elephant in the room”, and female workers 
also collude in keeping up the silence (Seymour, 2009). Perhaps with the explosive 
revelations about Harvey Weinstein we can see a shifting sensibility, which is de-normalizing 
not just sexual violence in the entertainment industry, but in organizations more generally. 
That is not to say that it was completely normalized before, nor that it will be completely de-
normalised in the future; but it is to say that way in which violence is or is not seen as 
violence is highly historically contingent.  
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This insight should, in turn, alert us to the possibility that violence may be present in ways 
that we don’t currently or normally notice. Stein (2001) notes that management discourse 
often uses euphemisms (‘rightsizing’, ‘downsizing’ etc) to refer to the destruction of jobs, 
and these make violence invisble. By contrast, those affected use “a language governed by 
imagery of the Holocaust and the Vietnam War, and the images of mutilation and 
destruction (‘dead meat’, ‘dead wood’...)” (Stein, 2001: 15). Similarly, Gabriel’s (2012) theory 
of organizational miasma shows how notions around death, murder and corpses can 
become prevalent in situations of downsizing. Such terminology has the opposite effect of 
managerial euphemism: it makes violence visible or present.  
 
These invocations of violence are not just metaphorical – they describe an experience of 
being violated – and downsizing is frequently accompanied by (the threat of) violence. There 
are numerous stories of individuals, particularly during the financial crisis, arriving one 
morning at work to be greeted by a security guard who allows them to pick up their personal 
staff and then literally pushes them out of the building. People are suddenly confronted by 
the reality of a normally hidden violence: a security guard who can and if necessary will quite 
‘legitimately’ force them out. That this use of security guards in situations of downsizing has 
become a common strategy is apparent in that whole websites are dedicated to the 
question of how to enact it:    
 
If you are laying off multiple employees, you can notify them all at once or one at a 
time… When you notify employees one at a time using a face-to-face meeting, have 
at least two people in the meeting representing the company so you have at least 
one witness ... If you are concerned about theft, violence or vandalism, hire a security 
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guard to be present during the notification, to monitor the employee's collection of 
his personal things and to escort him off the premises”. 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/security-planning-layoff-66731.html 
 
The role of the security guard is particularly interesting. Despite the increasing use of 
surveillance cameras (emblematic, perhaps, of disciplinary power) there has been a massive 
rise in corporate security services. The security guard constitutes, almost like a policeman, 
an embodiment of sovereign power. In some ways, one could say that in these kinds of 
organizations the potential of violence is part and parcel of the business model. Their role is 
precisely to keep everything in order, to serve as a deterrent to potential lawbreakers. While 
installed in the name of security and safety, security guards often carry signs of potential 
violence in terms of their boots, nightstick, or sometimes even guns. Their physicality, their 
bodies, are there to signal a threat to potential intruders and disturbers, and, indeed, many 
have a background in martial arts or, for that matter, as members of the police or the 
military. 
 
So the security guard is an example of where visible and invisible violence meet. The guard is 
indeed visible but is also a reminder of the way that violence lurks always as a potential, 
even if only infrequently used – precisely the ‘discontinuous’ power of the pre-modern 
sovereign – which is not an alternative to but sits alongside disciplinary power (Graeber, 
2015: 58). Just as the Weberian account of authority specifies the reasons why we may 
accept the right of others to give us orders, it also at the same time specifies that if we do 
not accept those orders we may rightfully be forced to do so. Individuals may both willingly 
construct their self in line with organizational discourse and practice, whilst also being aware 
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of the potential for violence – that is legal violence that confronts them as a larger force. 
Perhaps the recognition of such possibility would allow to us to add explanation of the kinds 
of resistance found (and not found) in organizations. The apparent lack of resistance, or put 
differently that resistance seems to be found mostly on a micro scale, covert and hidden 
rather than confrontational and overt may be explained not so much through the “effective” 
working of disciplinary power and an acceptance of authority, but more through the 
prevalence of potential legal violence and a recognition that little can be done to resist it. 
 
So far, we have suggested that the threat of (potential) violence is an absent-present 
possibility in organizations, which becomes particularly visible at the border (e.g. when 
people are fired) and when the order is under threat (e.g. resistance). But violence also 
enters socialization processes. For example, the recruitment rituals of corporations may 
involve similar kinds of hazing to those prevalent in initiation rituals of college clubs (Forbes, 
2014). We may also think here of the ways in which extreme sports and bootcamps that can 
significantly harm the body are prevalent in leadership development and teambuilding 
training. Perhaps most obvious is the presence of violence in training camps of military 
organizations. In Germany, there is a famous case of the death of a female marine office 
candidate who, as part of an exercise, had to climb up the rigging of the sailing ship seven 
times without any security or prior experience, and despite being physically exhausted. As a 
result, she fell down the rigging and died (Spiegel, 2011). This is an example of organizational 
violence in that showing the willingness to harm one’s body in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the organization is a necessary condition for acquiring membership.    
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To re-iterate, these examples where violence is visible may seem extreme and particular but 
we should not take this to mean that violence is absent from everyday organizational life. 
The frequency of actual violence is beside the point as the very potential of violence has 
performative effects. This potential is foundational to organizations for the same reasons 
that it is foundational to the state. The ways in which a social order is established, 
maintained and overthrown involves the potential for violence. That is why its potential is 
most visible in situations where the order is under threat or when actors are introduced to 
or removed from it. Whereas in such circumstances violence may reveal itself in subtle or 
not so subtle ways, overall organizations – management and even workers – seem to collude 
in the general notion that violence is absent or if not absent then exceptional or anomolous. 
However, this does not mean that the job of organization studies is to similarly render it 
invisible. And, indeed, it has not always done so. As Michel Crozier (1964) put it: “Direct 
coercion is still in reserve … but it is very rarely used, and people apparently no longer have 
to see it operate often to retain it in their calculations” (1964: 184-5). In this observation, 
Crozier is consonant with Elias’s formulation with which we began this essay, of “the physical 
violence stored behind the scenes of everyday life, a pressure totally familiar and hardly 
perceived" (Elias, 1978: 450). 
 
Conclusion 
Our argument in this essay has consisted of a series of steps. First, that whilst violence can 
be defined in relatively broad or narrow ways, and there is merit in both, a narrow definition 
which focusses on actual or potential physical violence has the particular merit of 
recognizing the distinctiveness of pain inflicted on the human body. If we take that as our 
 25 
focus, then we find that it is both absent and present in organizations and within 
organization studies.  
 
Second, whilst it is impossible to consider the totality of organization studies, by looking at 
the influential traditions deriving from Weber and Foucault we can show this absence and 
presence by considering how those authors get taken up and used within our field. To do 
that for either of those traditions (or any other) would take at least a paper in its own right. 
All we have done is given indications of how such an analysis would proceed: in both cases, 
albeit in different ways, the balance of presence and absence is tilted towards absenting 
violence. 
 
Finally, we argued that we can develop a sensibility for ‘seeing’ or ‘making present’ violence. 
This sensibility can take many forms, which are the counterpart of the ways that violence is 
kept invisible or ‘absented’. Thus violence becomes visible when we see it as close to our 
space (not just in faraway places), to our time (not just in times long ago), to our 
consumption (not just production) and to settings familiar to us (not just those seen as 
‘abnormal’). It becomes visible when we name it as such (rather than cloak it in 
euphemisms) and de-normalise it (rather than regard it as routine). More than anything, 
such a sensibility requires that we recognize that the moments at which the potential for 
violence becomes visible are not exceptions to the norm, but are the tips of an iceberg that 
permeates organizational life. 
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